Both in game theory and in general equilibrium theory there exists a numberof universally stable adjustment processes. In game theory these processes typically serve the role of selecting a Nash equilibrium. Examples are the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten or the equilibrium selection procedure proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey. In general equilibrium the processes are adjustment rules by which an auctioneer can clear all markets. Examples are the processes studied by Smale, Kamiya, van der Laan and Talman, and Herings. The underlying reasons for convergence have remained rather mysterious in the literature, and convergence of di erent processes has seemed unrelated. This paper shows that convergence of all these processes relies on Browder's xed point theorem.
Introduction
Both in game theory and in general equilibrium theory there exists a number of adjustment processes that are universally convergent. A u n i v ersally convergent adjustment process in game theory is an adjustment process that converges to a Nash equilibrium for almost all games. A universally convergent adjustment process in general equilibrium theory is an adjustment process that converges to a Walrasian equilibrium for almost all economies. In game theory these processes typically serve the role of selecting a Nash equilibrium. Examples are the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) or the equilibrium selection procedure proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) . In general equilibrium the processes are adjustment rules by which an auctioneer can clear all markets. Examples are the processes studied by Smale (1976) , van der Laan (1987) and Talman, Kamiya (1990) and Herings (1997a) .
There are several reasons to be interested in universally convergent adjustment processes. They give players in a game the opportunity to coordinate on a uniquely determined Nash equilibrium and an auctioneer in an economy to determine a competitive equilibrium price system. In a more decentralized setting, they give rational agents in an economy t h e possibility to coordinate on current and future prices. Such processes can be used as a tool to compute equilibria, which is also helpful for comparative statics exercises or policy recommendations, see Judd (1997) and Eaves and Schmedders (1999) .
In game theory multiplicity of Nash equilibria seems to be the rule rather than the exception. This poses serious problems for Nash equilibrium to be used as a solution concept for games. One way out is to develop a theory that selects a unique equilibrium for any game form, and to suppose that all players adopt that theory. An attempt to make s u c h a theory can be found in Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . This theory relies heavily on the tracing procedure as introduced in Harsanyi (1975) . The tracing procedure is a strategy adjustment procedure by which players can adopt initial beliefs about the play of their opponents and turn them into uniquely determined beliefs consistent with Nash equilibrium. The surprising aspect of the tracing procedure is that convergence to a Nash equilibrium takes place for almost any game for almost any initial beliefs, so the tracing procedure is universally convergent.
Quantal response equilibria as introduced in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) , are statistical versions of Nash equilibria, where each player's payo is subject to random error. The concept of equilibrium is consistent in the sense that all player's maximize their utility given the choices made by the others, and the utility maximizing behavior of a player, together with the error structure, leads to the mixed strategy against which the others optimize. Quantal response equilibria are quite successful in describing the behavior of participants in experiments. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) also consider a procedure simi-lar to the tracing procedure to select a Nash equilibrium. Start with the quantal response equilibrium where choices are completely determined by the error terms, and follow the path of quantal response equilibria that results when the error terms vanish. McKelvey and Palfrey show that for almost all games, a unique Nash equilibrium is selected in this way. Again, universal convergence of the procedure is obtained.
The simplest price adjustment process studied in general equilibrium theory is the Walrasian tatonnement process. It is well-known that it may not converge to a competitive equilibrium, see Scarf (1960) for some examples. The work of Sonnenschein (1972 Sonnenschein ( , 1973 , Mantel (1974) and Debreu (1974) , basically claiming that any function satisfying Walras' law is the excess demand function of an economy, makes clear that it is possible to construct many examples where Walrasian tatonnement does not converge and displays highly irregular dynamic behavior. The work of Saari and Simon (1978) and Saari (1985) implies that simple adaptations of the Walrasian tatonnement process will not have better convergence properties. Still, at least three universally convergent price adjustment processes are known in the literature, Smale's global Newton method introduced in Smale (1976) , the process of Kamiya (1990) , and the process proposed in van der Laan and Talman (1987) for which universal convergence has been shown in Herings (1997a) .
The global Newton method of Smale provides a price adjustment rule that does converge to a competitive equilibrium for almost any economy, so universal convergence is the case. But it does not converge for any initial price system. Only when the initial price system is chosen such that the prices of some commodities are su ciently close to zero, convergence to a competitive equilibrium can be shown. From the work of Keenan (1981) it follows that there may exist an open set of starting price systems for which Smale's process does not converge to some competitive equilibrium price system.
Another universally convergent price adjustment process has been presented in Kamiya (1990) . Under rather weak conditions on the total excess demand function, convergence to a competitive equilibrium price system is guaranteed for almost every starting price system. Although the boundary conditions of Kamiya are weak, they are not derived from assumptions on primitive concepts.
An alternative price adjustment process has been proposed in van der Laan and Talman (1987) . For this process universal convergence has beenshown in Herings (1997a) . Under standard conditions on utility functions, consumption sets and initial endowments, this price adjustment process converges t o a W alrasian equilibrium price system for almost all economies and almost all starting price systems.
Apparently, several processes in distinct areas of research have beenshown to beuniversally convergent. The reason for these strong convergence properties has remained mysterious up to now, and the convergence proofs were rather ad hoc as a consequence.
The aim of the current paper is to point out that convergence of each one of these processes can be understood from xed-point theory and is not even related to di erentiability. This makes our proofs very di erent from the original convergence proofs. It also increases our understanding as to why these distinct adjustment processes converge. This understanding is useful to develop other universally convergent m e c hanisms that may incorporate features that are lacking in current processes. For instance, the incorporation of strategic e ects of agents that supply and demand commodities in general equilibrium.
Some alternatives and extensions have already been suggested. The procedure descibed in Yamamoto (1993) may serve as an alternative to the tracing procedure, and Joosten and Talman (1997) describe an alternative price adjustment process. Extensions have b e e n made to economies with linear or constant returns to scale production, see van den Elzen (1993 Elzen ( , 1997 and van den Elzen, van der Laan and Talman (1994) , and to economies with short-run price rigidities, see Herings (1996) , Herings, van der Laan, Talman and Venniker (1997) , Venniker (1998), and Talman (1999) . All these extensions can beunderstood as well from the unifying treatment that is given in this paper.
A Unifying Approach
Before turning to the speci c adjustment processes, it is helpful to highlight the approach that can beused to give a unifying treatment of convergence. Usually, dynamic processes are de ned by a system of rst-order di erential equations
where x(t) 2 IR m denotes the state vector reached at time t 2 IR + and g is a function from some subset of the state space IR m into IR m : The vector x typically corresponds to a mixed strategy combination in case of a strategy adjustment process, and to a price system for a price adjustment process. The function g speci es the way in which players adjust their strategies, or prices adjust in general equilibrium. The initial state x(0) is assumed to be given. Conditions for which the system of di erential equations has a solution are well-known, see for instance Hirsch and Smale (1974) . The orbit (x(0)) is the set of state vectors that is generated by the system of rst-order di erential equations when the initial state is x(0) (x(0)) = fx 2 IR m j 9 t 0 x = x(t)g:
We denote the closure of (x(0)) by (x(0)) and call (x(0)) an orbit as well.
Although all adjustment processes we consider can beformulated as a system of differential equations, they can alternatively be described by the orbit that they generate.
In fact, all adjustment processes considered share the property that the easiest way to formulate them is in terms of the orbit that they generate. For each adjustment process, we de ne a system of equations whose solutions correspond to the orbit of the adjustment process. We study the properties of the set of solutions to the system of equations by means of xed point theory and not by the theory of dynamic systems.
Our assumptions on primitives are so weak, that orbits are not necessarily nicely behaved sets, that is di erentiable paths or loops. It is for instance possible that pitchforks may arise, or even higher dimensional solution sets. The way that is usually dealt with such complications is to show that they generically do not occur. For almost all games and for almost all economies that satisfy suitable di erentiability conditions, orbits are di erentiable paths or loops. We show that as far as convergence is concerned, neither genericity arguments nor di erentiability are the main driving forces. Instead, the key to understand convergence comes from an entirely di erent direction, xed point theory. In this paper we argue that the convergence of the tracing procedure of Harsanyi and Selten, the selection of a Nash equilibrium by means of quantal response equilibria as proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey, and the convergence of the price adjustment processes of Smale, Kamiya, and van der Laan and Talman, are best understood from a single xed point theorem that is introduced in Browder (1960) . Theorem 2.1 implies that for all 2 0 1] (f g S) \ F ' 6 = : That property would also follow f r o m a repeated application of the well-known xed point theorem of Brouwer (1912) . The surprising part of the theorem is that there exists a connected set F c ' with those properties. Notice that along the connected set of xed points, it is not necessarily the case that increases monotonically from 0 to 1. The value of increases initially, m a y decrease later on, and will eventually increase until it reaches the value 1.
The Tracing Procedure of Harsanyi and Selten
The tracing procedure is used repeatedly in the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) to nd a unique solution of so-called basic games. It is also used to de ne risk-dominance relationships between Nash equilibria. It models a process of convergent expectations by w h i c h rational players will come to adopt and expect each other to adopt on a particular Nash equilibrium as the solution for a given game. Before applying the tracing procedure, players are assumed to have a common probability distribution expressing their expectations about the strategy choices of the other players. This common probability distribution is called a prior. In the linear tracing procedure the information on the best replies to the prior is gradually fed back i n to the expectations of the players. As the linear tracing procedure proceeds, both the prior and the best responses will gradually change until both converge to some Nash equilibrium of the game.
Consider a Here we identify all probability distributions on i with S M i = fs i 2 IR M i j P M i j=1 s ij = 1 g: Given a mixed strategy combination s 2 S and a mixed strategy s i 2 S i we denote by s n s i the mixed strategy combination that results from replacing s i by s i : The set of Nash equilibria of ; is denoted NE(;): A probability distribution s 0 2 S called the prior, is given for the remainder of this paper. The prior describes the initial beliefs of all players about the strategies played by t h e other players. The prior is assumed to bethe same for all players, and the determination of the prior is part of the equilibrium selection theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988) . The game ; 0 corresponds to a trivial game, where all players believe that all their opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior beliefs. The game ; 1 coincides with the game ;: The linear tracing procedure links a Nash equilibrium of the game ; 0 to a Nash equilibrium of ; 1 : Let L denote the set of all Nash equilibria related to the games ;
The linear tracing procedure is said to feasible if there exists a continuous function :
The linear tracing procedure is said to be well-de ned if there exists a unique way to connect (0) to (1) by a continuous function. We consider feasibility a s the more important property. Indeed, it is possible to go from feasibility t o w ell-de nedness by i n voking certain regularity properties of L: These regularity properties follow from the theory of di erential topology, as L is a set de ned by M equations in M + 1 unknowns, leaving one degree of freedom for a typical game, see Herings and Peeters (1999) for a rigorous proof.
Since L is a s e t that can bedescribed by a nite numberof polynomial inequalities, it is a semi-algebraic set. All the components of L that is all maximally connected subsets of L are also path-connected. Therefore, any two points in a component of L can bejoined by a path, see for instance Schanuel, Simon, and Zame (1991) for a n i c e i n troduction into the properties of semi-algebraic sets. To show that the linear tracing procedure is feasible, it is su cient to show that L has a component that intersects boththe sets f0g S and f1g S:
The proof of feasibility of the linear tracing procedure presented here is not new. It coincides with one of the proofs proposed in Herings (1997b) . It is repeated here for illustrational purposes, as the connection between Browder's xed point theorem and the tracing procedure is the closest of all the adjustment processes that we will consider.
Let the function i : 0 1] S ! S M i bede ned by i ( s) = a r g max
The function i is continuous since the penalty ;ks i ; s i k 2 2 is strictly concave in s i :
We de ne the function f :
The xed points of f are closely related to the strategies in the set L: 
it holds that, for 0 < " < 1 H i (sn"s i + ( 1 ;")s i );H i (s) = "h > 0: Now, k("s i + ( 1 ;")s i );s i k 2 = " 2 ks i ; s i k 2 < "h for small enough " contradicting that s i is the argument maximizing the expression in the de nition of i ( s):
Q.E.D.
The argument given in the proof of Theorem 3.1 is the same as the one used in Geanakoplos (1996) , where Brouwer's xed point theorem, as opposed to Kakutani's xed point theorem, is used to show the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a nite non-cooperative N-person game. Theorem 3.2: For any non-cooperative N-person game ; for any prior s 0 the tracing procedure is feasible.
Proof: It is immediate that f satis es the conditions of Browder's xed point theorem and so there is a component F c of F = f( s) 2 0 1] S j s = f ( s)g such that (f0g S) \F c 6 = and (f1g S) \F c 6 = : By Theorem 3.1 it follows that F = L so F c is a subset of L that connects a best response to the prior s 0 to a Nash equilibrium s : Q.E.D.
Feasibility o f the tracing procedure is a corollary to Browder's xed point theorem.
The Quantal Response Equilibria of McKelvey and Palfrey
Quantal response equilibria as introduced in McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) , are statistical versions of Nash equilibria, where each player's payo is subject to random error. One possible interpretation is that players make errors according to some random process when calculating their expected payo s. An alternative interpretation is that players calculate expected payo s correctly, but have an additive payo disturbance associated with each available pure strategy. For a given speci cation of the error structure, a quantal response equilibrium is a mixed strategy combination that is consistent with optimizing behavior subject to the error structure. Consider a non-cooperative N-person normal form game ; = ( 1 : : : N R 1 : : : R N ): Player i's payo when playing pure strategy (i k) against a mixed strategy combination s is subject to error and is given by b R i (s n (i k)) = R i (s n (i k)) + " ik : Player i's error vector " i = (" i1 : : : " iM i ) is distributed according to a joint distribution with density function i : Given the vector of payo s that player i receives when playing his pure strategies and when errors are absent, R i = ( R i (s n (i 1)) : : : R i (s n (i M i ))) for some s 2 S the ik-response set E ik (R i ) is de ned as the set of error vectors that make pure strategy (i k) the best response, so E ik (R i ) = f" i 2 IR M i j R ik + " ik R ij + " ij j = 1 : : : M i g:
The probability o f c hoosing pure strategy (i k) is then given by
A quantal response equilibrium is a mixed strategy combination s 2 S that is consistent with the error structure, thus s ik = ik (R i (s n (i 1)) : : : R i (s n (i M i ))) i = 1 : : : N k = 1 : : : M i :
The following speci cation of the error structure is quite common in the theory of individual choice behavior, see Luce (1959) , and leads to the logistic quantal response equilibria. For any parameter 0 the logistic quantal response function is de ned by
and is obtained when i corresponds to the extreme value distribution. The parameter is inversely related to the error level. When = 0 the choice of all players is completely determined by the errors, and corresponds to playing all pure strategies with equal probability. When approaches in nity, the in uence of the errors disappears. This suggests a way of selecting Nash equilibria analogously to the tracing procedure. Start from the quantal response equilibrium at = 0 and let the in uence of errors go to zero. McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) show that for generic games, this approach selects a unique Nash equilibrium. We s h o w that for all games the quantal response equilibrium at = 0 is connected by a set of quantal response equilibria to at least one Nash equilibrium. The xed points of f are closely related to the strategies in the set e Q:
Theorem
Proof: Obvious.
The following result follows immediately from Browder's xed point theorem, so a proof is omitted. The theorem makes clear that the unique quantal response equilibrium at = 0 is connected by q u a n tal response equilibria to a quantal response equilibrium for an arbitrarily high value of : The next step is to extend Theorem 4.2 and to consider what happens in the limit. In particular, we want to show that the quantal response equilibrium at = 0 is connected by quantal response equilibria to a Nash equilibrium. To this end, we de ne Q = e Q (f1g NE (;)) and we show the following result. Let ( s) be an element of Q c : Then there exists a sequence of points f( n s n )g n2IN such that n < 1 f ( n s n ) = s n and ( n s n ) ! ( s): If < 1 then the continuity of f implies ( s) 2 e Q Q: Suppose = 1 and suppose s is not a Nash equilibrium. Then there is a player i a pair of pure strategies (i k) and (i l) and " > 0 such that s ik > 0 but R i (s n (i k)) + " < R i (s n (i l)): Since s n ! s there is n such that R i (s n n (i k)) + " < R i (s n n (i l)) for all n n: However, As was the case for the tracing procedure, Browder's xed point theorem is the basic tool needed to show the connectedness of the quantal response equilibrium at = 0 to a Nash equilibrium.
The Global Newton Method of Smale
The correspondence with Browder's xed point theorem is almost immediate for procedures to select Nash equilibria in games. For price adjustment processes, the relationship is a little harder to detect.
There are several versions of Smale's global Newton method. Here we follow the approach suggested in Smale (1976) Assumption 1 is weak version of the assumption in Smale (1976) , where twice continuous di erentiability o f z is assumed and a rather complicated boundary condition is stated. We follow here the suggestion of Varian (1977) and weaken the boundary condition of Smale (1976) to the requirement that z(p) ; z(p)1 1 is not radially outward pointing, i.e. there is no > 0 such that z(p) ; z(p)1 1 = (p ; (1=L)11):
The assumed boundary behavior is weaker than the requirement that z l (p) > 0 for some l 2 L for which p l = 0 a requirement that is natural for a function de ned on IR L + n f 0g: Indeed, if l is such that p l = 0 and z l (p) > 0 then Walras' law implies that there is l 0 such that p l 0 > 0 and z l (p) > z l 0(p): So, z l (p) ; z(p) > z l 0(p) ; z(p) whereas ;1=L = p l ; 1=L < p l 0 ; 1=L which implies that z(p) ; z(p) is not radially outward pointing.
By Walras' law we can normalize prices such as to belong to S L : The suggestion of Varian (1977) z(p) dp dt = ; (p)b z(p) i m p l i e s @ e z L (p) dp dt = ; (p)e z L (p) so the adjustment of the price of commodity L is similar to the adjustment of the prices of other commodities. Since 11 > dp dt = 0 the sum of the prices is kept equal to one.
We c hoose the starting price system p 0 in the relative boundary of B L \T L to guarantee convergence to a competitive equilibrium price system. In Keenan (1981) it has been shown that Smale's process may not converge for starting price systems in the relative i n terior of B L \ T L :
As Smale (1976) shows, his process generates price systems in the set P = fp 2 B L \ T L j 9 0 e z(p) = e z(p 0 )g: It is easily veri ed, by taking = 1 that p 0 2 P and, by taking = 0 that p 2 P if p 2 S L is an equilibrium price system. By the arguments given before there are no solutions for = 0 with p 2 (B L \ T L ) n S L : From the de nition of the set P it follows that the di erential equation adjusts prices in such a w ay that the excess demand remains proportional to the excess demand at the starting price system. Under suitable di erentiability assumptions, for a generic economy, Smale (1976) shows that the component o f P containing p 0 is a path that connects p 0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. We show that even without such di erentiability assumptions, and without restricting attention to generic economies, the component of P containing p 0 connects p 0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Smale's global Newton method is said to be convergent if this latter property holds. The projection of an arbitrary vector x on the set e T L ( ) is determined by the following optimization problem. When p is a competitive equilibrium price system, then p is a xed point o f f for any value of exceeding (p ): When p is a price system generated by the adjustment process, but does not correspond to a competitive equilibrium, then p is a xed point o f f ( (p) ) where (p) < 1:
At p 0 the value of ( ) is zero. Along the path of the adjustment process, the value of ( ) increases initially, b u t it may decrease later on. Eventually, it will increase until it reaches the value 1 and a competitive equilibrium has beenfound. (1)) \F c 6 = and (f1g T L (1)) \F c 6 = : By Theorem 5.1 it follows that F = P so F c is a subset of P that connects the starting price system p 0 to some competitive equilibrium price system p :
The proof of Theorem 5.2 show that convergence of the price adjustment process is a corollary to Browder's xed point theorem.
6 The Price Adjustment Process of Kamiya In Kamiya (1990) the prices of commodities are normalized by assuming that P L l=1 (p l ) 2 = 1 :
An adjustment process is de ned for a total excess demand function z : IR L + n f 0g ! IR L and a starting price system p 0 2 IR L ++ with P L l=1 (p 0 l ) 2 = 1: The following assumption is made throughout this section. Assumption 2 is a weak version of the assumptions in Kamiya (1990) , where also twice continuous di erentiability of z on IR L ++ is assumed. Using the normalization discussed above a n d W alras' law, we can replace the excess demand function z by the excess demand As Kamiya (1990) shows, prices generated by the di erential equation belong to the set P = fb p 2 IR L;1 + j P L;1 l=1 (b p l ) 2 < 1 9 2 0 1] for l = 1 : : : L ; 1 b z l (b p) = ( 1 ; )(b p l ; p 0 l )g: It is easily veri ed that = 0 yields p = p 0 as the unique solution, so p 0 2 P:By considering = 1 it follows that if p is a Walrasian equilibrium price system with P L l=1 (p l ) 2 = 1 then (p 1 : : : p L;1 ) 2 P:From the de nition of the set P it follows that the di erential equation
adjusts prices in such a way that the excess demand at a price system is proportional to the di erence between this price system and the initial price system. Kamiya (1990) shows that under suitable di erentiability assumptions, for a generic economy, the component of P containing p 0 is a path that connects p 0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. We show that even without di erentiability assumptions, and without restricting attention to generic economies, the component o f P containing p 0 connects p 0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. Kamiya's adjustment process is said to beconvergent if this latter property holds.
It follows from the boundarybehavior and the continuity of z that there exists " > 0 Consider the case > 0: The projection of an arbitrary vector x on the set T L;1 ( ) i s determined by the following optimization problem.
rem and so there is a component F c of
that (f0g T L;1 (1)) \ F c 6 = and (f1g T L;1 (1)) \ F c 6 = : By Theorem 6.2 it follows that F = P so F c is a subset of P that connects the starting price system b p 0 to some competitive equilibrium price system b p :
Convergence of the price adjustment process is a corollary to Browder's xed point theorem.
7 The Price Adjustment Process of van der Laan and Talman Van der Laan and Talman (1987) Two types of restrictions are made on prices in the set P:The rst is an innocuous price normalization, P L l=1 p l = 1 : The second concerns the requirement that the relative price of a commodity, i.e. the ratio of the price of a commodity and its initial price, be minimal when the commodity is in positive excess supply, and maximal when the commodity is in positive excess demand. This is closely related to the ideas behind Walrasian tatonnement, where prices of commodities in positive excess supply are decreased and those of commodities in positive excess demand are increased. It is obvious that the starting price system p 0 belongs to P: It can also be veri ed that whenever p is a Walrasian equilibrium price system with P L l=1 p l = 1 then p 2 P:
In Herings (1997) it is shown that, under suitable di erentiability assumptions, for a generic economy, the component o f P containing p 0 is a path that connects p 0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. We show that even without such di erentiability assumptions, and without restricting attention to generic economies, the component o f P containing p 0 connects p 0 to a Walrasian equilibrium price system. The adjustment process is said to be convergent if this latter property holds.
To simplify the exposition, we renormalize the units of measurement of quantities of Contrary to Assumptions 1 and 2, Assumption 3 follows from standard assumptions on primitives, that is from standard assumptions on consumption sets, utility functions, and initial endowments.
The continuity and the boundary behavior of z imply that we can choose " > 0 such that for any p 2 S L (") = fp 2 S L j p l " l = 1 : : : L g it holds that z l (p) > 0 for some l with 0 < p l ":
We modify the value function v near the boundary of S L and extend it to a function e v de ned on T L = fp 2 IR L j P L l=1 p l = 1 g by setting
We de ne the set e P by omitting non-negativity constraints and replacing Consider The xed points of f coincide with the prices in the set P: Q.E.D.
When p is a competitive equilibrium, then p is a xed point of f for any value of exceeding (p ): When p is a price system generated by the adjustment process, but not a competitive equilibrium, then p is a xed point of f ( (p) ):
At p 0 the value of ( ) is zero. Along the path of the adjustment process, the value of ( ) increases initially, b u t it may decrease later on. Eventually, it will increase until it reaches the value 1 and a competitive equilibrium has beenfound. Theorem 7.3: The price adjustment process converges for any excess demand function satisfying Assumption 3.
Proof: It is immediate that f satis es the conditions of Browder's xed point theorem and so there is a component F c of F = f( p) 2 0 1] T L (1) j p = f ( p)g such that (f0g T L (1)) \F c 6 = and (f1g T L (1)) \F c 6 = : By Theorem 7.2 it follows that F = P so F c is a subset of P that connects the starting price system p 0 to some competitive equilibrium price system p :
Once again, the convergence of a price adjustment process is intimately connected to Browder's xed point theorem.
Conclusion
We have studied the convergence of a number of distinct adjustment processes in game theory and in general equilibrium theory. Convergence of the processes has been shown before in the literature by rather ad hoc arguments, and only for generic games and generic economies, under suitable di erentiability assumptions. We have argued that the driving force behind convergence is to befound in Browder's xed point theorem, which applies under very general conditions and does not involve any assumptions on di erentiability. It is remarkable that not only existence of equilibrium, but also universal stability, is fundamentally based on xed point t h e o r y . The use of Browder's result provides a uniform and simple way to show convergence of all the adjustment processes considered. It also enables us to design a sheer unlimited number of new adjustment processes, that are universally convergent.
